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INTRODUCTION—THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF THE “FAMILY” IN CANADA 
The social and legal concepts of “the family” in Canada have changed 
dramatically over the past half century.  While opposite-sex married 
couples with children remain the most common family form, the 2006 
Census revealed that these families are no longer the majority.1  The 
divorce rate has risen dramatically over the past several decades, with more 
than one in three marriages now ending in divorce.2  Consequently, single-
parent families, blended families, and step-families are now common, and 
there has been a substantial increase in the number of lone-parent families, 
though most (approximately 80%) remain headed by women.3  Also, the 
number of unmarried opposite-sex couples has been growing rapidly, rising 
from about 6% of all Census families in 1981 to 16% in 2006, and Canada 
now gives extensive legal recognition to non-marital cohabitation.4  
Finally, over the past two decades there has been increasing legal and 
social acceptance of same-sex relationships.  As a result of litigation in the 
late 1990s under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (the equality rights provision),5 the federal Parliament and 
provincial legislatures enacted legislation to recognize same-sex 
relationships as similar to non-marital opposite-sex relationships, and in 
2005, Canada became the third country in the world to legalize same-sex 
marriage.  About one in six of the same-sex couples identified in the 2006 
Census were married, with the rest living in non-marital relationships.6 
Like “family” and “spouse,” the concept of “parenthood” has also been 
                                                          
 1. See THE VANIER INST. OF THE FAMILY, FAMILIES COUNT: PROFILING CANADA’S 
FAMILIES IV 26 (2010) [hereinafter VANIER] (according to the 1981 Census, 55% of all 
census families in Canada were married-couple families with children, but this number 
dropped below the 50% mark in 1991 and fell again to 38.7% of all families in 2006, 
with the result that this family type is “now less than the majority in all provinces and 
territories”). 
 2. Id. at 44. 
 3. Id. at 26. 
 4. See, e.g., Kerr v. Baranow, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269, 279 (Can.) (reviewing and 
consolidating jurisprudence from the previous three decades that recognizes that 
property claims must be protected if parties have cohabited and have undertaken a 
“joint family venture”).  Every Canadian jurisdiction except Quebec has legislation 
which recognizes “spousal support” rights of unmarried partners.  In Droit de le famille 
102866, [2010] Q.A.C. 1978, para. 169 (Can. Que. C.A.), the Quebec Court of Appeal 
held that the failure to enact such legislation in Quebec was a violation of section 15 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  The Supreme Court heard the appeal in 
this case on January 18, 2012. 
 5. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, 
c. 11 (U.K.). 
 6. See VANIER, supra note 1, at 26; see also 2006 Census: Family Portrait: 
Continuity and Change in Canadian Families and Households in 2006: National 
Portrait: Census Families, STATISTICS CANADA (Nov. 20, 2009) 
http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-553/p4-eng.cfm (reporting 
that 16.2% of same-sex married couples had children and 7.5% of same-sex non-
marital cohabitants had children). 
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transformed.  In the latter part of the twentieth century, the legal concept of 
“illegitimacy” was abolished and Canada gave legal recognition to 
psychological parents, beginning with step-parents in traditional opposite-
sex marriages.  More recently, the concept of parenthood has been 
broadened to reflect the surge in the use of assisted reproductive 
technologies (ARTs) by both homosexual and heterosexual couples to 
conceive children.7  It is this changing definition of “parent” in Canada—
with a particular focus on some of the issues raised by ARTs—that is the 
subject of this Article.   
Our central theme is that, consistent with the relatively expansive 
concept of “spouse,” in comparison to many other countries, Canadian 
legislatures and courts have developed a relatively broad and child-focused 
approach to the concept of “parent,” one that recognizes the importance of 
social and psychological parents and now includes the same-sex partners of 
lesbian biological mothers.  However, Canadian law has not fully kept pace 
with technological and social change, and there is a need for statutory 
reform to better address the issues that are raised by the growing use and 
sophistication of ARTs.8  Many questions related to ARTs have been left 
for judges to resolve, or for lawyers to attempt to provide advice to clients, 
in the absence of clear legislation or binding precedent.  Further, present 
laws significantly restrict the use of surrogacy agreements and payments to 
gamete donors; while facially neutral, these laws have a disproportionate 
impact on same-sex partners, especially lesbians. 
This Article surveys some of the salient issues and controversies related 
to the establishment of parent-child relationships in Canada, with a 
particular focus on questions related to ARTs and same-sex parenting.  
Given the complexity of these issues as well as space limitations, this 
Article does not provide a detailed review of all of the relevant Canadian 
                                                          
 7. See Introduction to Assisted Human Reproduction (AHR), HEALTH CANADA 
(Feb. 1, 2008), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/reprod/hc-sc/index-eng.php (estimating 
that up to one in eight Canadian couples experience infertility). 
 8. See Susan B. Boyd, Gendering Legal Parenthood: Bio-Genetic Ties, 
Intentionality and Responsibility, 25 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 63, 67 (2007); see 
also Pratten v. British Columbia, [2011] B.C.S.C. 656, para. 330 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.) 
(illustrating the law’s failure to keep pace with the new social realities created as a 
result of the increasing use of ARTs, where a woman who had been conceived using 
sperm from an anonymous donor successfully challenged various provisions of the 
provincial adoption legislation and its associated regulations).  The court found that the 
impugned sections contravened section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms since they mandated that information regarding the family history and 
origins of adopted children be recorded and preserved, but did not extend these same 
rights to donor offspring.  Pratten, [2011] B.C.S.C. 656, para. 330.  The British 
Columbia Supreme Court also granted a permanent injunction to prevent the disposal 
or destruction of Gamete Donor Records in the province.  Id.  For further discussion of 
the issue of de-anonymization of sperm donors in Canada, see Angela Cameron, 
Vanessa Gruben & Fiona Kelly, De-Anonymising Sperm Donors in Canada: Some 
Doubts and Directions, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 95 (2010). 
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case law and statutes, but rather, identifies central themes and discusses 
particular jurisprudence and legislation that may serve as useful precedents 
for other countries.   
Part I of this Article examines the traditional legal bases for establishing 
legal parentage, beginning with the historical legal presumptions which 
privileged “biology and marriage when ordering and sanctioning 
relationships.”9  Some of the current provincial legislation continues to rely 
on these presumptions, and thus does not adequately address the new 
familial models that arise out of reproductive technologies.  Part I of the 
Article also considers the expansion of the definition of “parenthood” in 
Canada through the concepts of “standing in the place of a parent” and 
adoption, with a particular focus on the applicability of these concepts to 
cases where children are conceived by ARTs.10  Part II reviews the 
Canadian legislation that has been enacted to address issues related to 
ARTs, as well as the case law which has interpreted or constitutionally 
challenged some of that legislation.  As we discuss, Quebec has Canada’s 
most comprehensive statutory regime, allowing for the use of informal 
agreements to facilitate a “parental project” involving ARTs, while Alberta 
has recently enacted a progressive statutory regime which explicitly gives 
parental status to same-sex partners if children are conceived by the use of 
ARTs.  Part III examines Canadian cases where courts have had to address 
ART issues without a relevant legislative framework.  Where the provincial 
governments have been slow to act, the courts have not infrequently filled 
the gap by taking child-focused approaches that recognize the equality of 
same-sex and opposite-sex partnerships, and have affirmed the possibility 
of a child having two lesbian mothers and a biological father identified on 
the child’s birth certificate.   
The final section of the Article considers the desirability of change in the 
legal regulation and accessibility of ARTs in Canada.  We argue that there 
is a clear need for better legislative direction, including clear statutory 
recognition of same-sex parental partnerships and surrogacy agreements.  
In order to provide greater certainty and to promote the welfare of children, 
Canadian jurisdictions need statutory reform to better address the issues 
being raised by the growing use of ARTs.  For instance, the 2010 British 
Columbia discussion paper on family law reform provides a useful set of 
recommendations for that province and elsewhere.11  We maintain that 
                                                          
 9. Roxanne Mykitiuk, Beyond Conception: Legal Determinations of Filiation in 
the Context of Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 39 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 771, 774 
(2001). 
 10. See Nicholas Bala, Who is a ‘Parent?’ ‘Standing in the Place of a Parent’ and 
Section 5 of the Child Support Guidelines, in SPECIAL LECTURES 2006: FAMILY LAW 
71, 76 (The Law Society of Upper Canada ed., 2007). 
 11. B.C., MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY GEN., JUSTICE SERV. BRANCH, CIVIL POLICY AND 
LEGISLATION OFFICE, WHITE PAPER ON FAMILY RELATIONS ACT REFORM: PROPOSALS 
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there must also be improved access to ARTs, by removing the prohibitions 
on payments for gamete and embryo donation in the federal Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act,12 and greater support for access to ARTs under 
provincial health care plans. 
By way of introduction, it is useful to briefly mention the complex 
division of constitutional responsibility for family law issues in Canada.  
The provinces have primary jurisdiction over most issues related to civil 
status, including family law and the definition of “parent.”  However, 
pursuant to the Constitution Act, 1867,13 the federal Parliament has the 
exclusive jurisdiction to make laws in relation to “marriage and divorce,” 
including corollary relief provisions for support and custody under the 
Divorce Act.14  Further, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction 
over criminal law, which includes the authority to restrict or prohibit a 
range of practices related to ARTs and surrogacy. 
I.  TRADITIONAL BASES FOR PARENTHOOD IN CANADA 
A.  Historical Presumptions of Parentage Based on Birth and Marriage 
Historically, it was presumed that “the act of giving birth necessarily 
resulted in motherhood.”15  Prior to the development in the late twentieth 
century of highly reliable DNA testing, paternity could not be as easily—or 
conclusively—established as motherhood.  As a result, the law developed a 
set of presumptions to assign biological fatherhood.  These rules were 
premised on two ideas: first, that the “biological father of a child . . . [was] 
most likely the man having sexual intercourse with the mother” at the time 
of conception, and second, that “the man most likely to be having sexual 
intercourse with the mother . . . [was] her husband.”16  Paternity was thus 
largely determined according to a man’s relationship with the mother of the 
child: if he was her husband, he was presumed to be the father of her child.  
Though this presumption was rebuttable, prior to the advent of DNA 
testing, it was very difficult for a married man to overcome in the absence 
of any evidence that he had no sexual access to his wife around the likely 
                                                          
FOR A NEW FAMILY LAW ACT (2010).  As discussed below, these proposals were 
reflected in the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 (Can.), which has been enacted but 
not proclaimed in force.  See infra p. 558. 
 12. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.). 
 13. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, 
app. II, no. 5 § 91 (Can.). 
 14. Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2d Supp.) (Can.). 
 15. Mykitiuk, supra note 9, at 778. 
 16. Fiona Kelly, Producing Paternity: The Role of Legal Fatherhood in 
Maintaining the Traditional Family, 21 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 315, 318 (2009) 
[hereinafter Kelly, Producing Paternity]. 
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time of conception.17  If a child was born out of wedlock, there was 
historically no presumption of paternity. 
B.  Standing in the Place of a Parent—Recognizing Psychological 
Parenthood 
For very limited purposes, such as allowing a survivor to make a tort 
claim, the common law recognized circumstances in which a legal parent-
child relationship could be found to exist based on the assumption of a 
parental role.  In other words, in very specific cases, the common law 
accepted that a person could be found to be standing in loco parentis (Latin 
for “in the place of a parent”) vis-à-vis a child.  This legal recognition of 
psychological parenthood was considerably extended in Canada in the 1968 
Divorce Act, where for purposes of post-separation child support, custody, 
and access, a “child of the marriage” was defined to include a child for 
whom a spouse had stood in loco parentis.18  Starting in the 1970s, 
Canadian courts also began to adopt a “best interests of the child” approach 
to custody law, allowing persons who had cared for a child for a significant 
period of time and whom the child had come to regard as parental figures—
psychological parents—to have custody of the child in cases where an 
absent biological parent sought to regain custody of the child.19  When a 
new Divorce Act20 was enacted in 1985, the Latin terminology was 
replaced, with subsection 2(2) now specifying that a “child of the 
marriage” refers to a child for whom a spouse “stands in the place of a 
parent.”21 Provincial legislation that recognizes the legal concept of 
psychological parenthood for such purposes as child support and 
dependents’ relief claims after death has also been enacted.22 
The Canadian courts have adopted a multi-factor approach to the 
determination of whether a person has “stood in the place of a parent.”  The 
provision of economic support is necessary, but not sufficient; there must 
also be a significant degree of care provided, as evidenced by such conduct 
as “parent-like” participation in recreational, social, and familial activities, 
                                                          
 17. Angela Campbell, Conceiving Parents Through Law, 21 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & 
FAM. 242, 250 (2007). 
 18. Divorce Act, S.C. 1968, c. 24 (Can.). 
 19. See, e.g., Moores v. Feldstein, [1973] 3 O.R. 921 (Can. Ont. C.A.); King v. 
Low, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 87 (Can.) (demonstrating that in terms of affording rights of 
custody and access to psychological parents, Canada has taken a child-focused 
approach). 
 20. Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2d Supp.) § 2(2) (Can.). 
 21. See Bala, supra note 10, at 76 (noting that this new language has taken on a 
“considerably broader meaning” than its Latin antecedent and, consequently, social 
parents in Canada have been accorded “broader rights and obligations than in any other 
country in the world”). 
 22. See id. 
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as well as the provision of nurturance, discipline, or direction.  The nature 
or existence of the child’s relationship with the absent biological parent is 
also a relevant factor.  Once the relationship of standing in the place of a 
parent has been established, it cannot be terminated by the unilateral acts or 
attitudes of the step-parent after separation.23 
A finding that a psychological parent has “stood in the place of a parent” 
may result in a child having three (or more) persons with significant 
parental rights and obligations.  While Canada’s Child Support Guidelines 
(Guidelines) make clear that the child support obligations of a 
psychological parent may be reduced if the biological parents are able to 
adequately support the child, it is not uncommon after having divorced 
from the biological parent for a step-parent—especially a step-father—to 
be liable for the full amount of support under the Guidelines.24  Almost all 
of the reported cases which have determined whether or not a person 
“stood in the place of a parent” have involved opposite-sex partners, 
typically with a step-father arguing that he did not have a child support 
obligation after separation.  However, despite its prevalence in the cases of 
heterosexual families, the concept is also significant for same-sex partners.  
For example, by the mid-1990s, it was accepted that after separation, the 
lesbian partner of a child’s biological mother could have “parental” rights 
and support obligations.25 
The 2007 Alberta case of H. (D.W.) v. R. (D.J.) is illustrative of the 
recent cases involving children conceived by ARTs to same-sex partners 
and the significance given to the legal status of psychological parents.26  
Two men who had been involved in a long-term relationship decided to 
have children with a lesbian couple.27  It was agreed amongst the four of 
them that one of the women would be impregnated with the sperm of one 
of the men, and that a child would be conceived for each couple.  The first 
baby was given to the biological father and his partner and was raised in 
their household.28  Thereafter, the men had primary custody of the child, 
though the biological mother enjoyed regular visits.29  When the biological 
                                                          
 23. E.g., Chartier v. Chartier, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 242 (Can.). 
 24. Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/1997-175, § 5 (Can.). 
 25.  See Buist v. Greaves, [1997] O.J. No. 2646, para. 27 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.) (QL) 
(ordering the non-biological mother to pay spousal support). 
 26. D.W.H. v. D.J.R., 2007 ABCA 57, para. 16 (Can. Alta. C.A.); see also D.W.H. 
v. D.J.R., 2009 ABQB 438, para. 107 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (affirming  the appellant’s 
application for access); D.W.H. v. D.J.R., 2011 ABQB 608, para. 1 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) 
(invoking section 15 of the Charter to grant the partner of the biological father the 
status of a “parent”).  As of August 2011, the Alberta legislation was amended to deal 
with this type of situation in a more child-focused way, but that legislation was not 
retroactive; hence, this litigation occurred. 
 27. D.W.H., 2007 ABCA. 57, at para. 3. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at para. 4. 
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father and his partner eventually separated, the biological parents refused to 
allow him to see the child.30  The former partner of the biological father 
made an application for access, but the chambers judge refused to make the 
order, giving effect to the wishes of the biological parents.31  The Alberta 
Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s decision on the basis that it 
gave insufficient weight to the role of the former partner in the child’s life; 
indeed, the Court noted that he had helped plan the conception, prepared 
the home for the child’s birth, was present in the delivery room, and after 
the child was born had participated in her care for three years.32  The Court 
also found much evidence to indicate that he had “stood in the place of a 
parent”—he had been in a relationship of some permanence with the 
biological father at the time of the child’s birth and throughout most of her 
life, and his actions had demonstrated a settled intention to act as a parent.33  
The former partner’s HIV-positive status and his alleged poor choices in 
his intimate relationships were not sufficient to conclude that his continued 
relationship with the child was contrary to her best interests and thus, were 
not enough to defeat his claim for access.34 
C.  Modern Statutory Presumptions of Paternity 
Historically, children born out of wedlock in Canada—“illegitimate 
children”—were subject to many forms of social and legal discrimination, 
such as restrictions on their right to inherit property from their fathers.  In 
the 1970s and early 1980s, legislation and Charter-based litigation resulted 
in the abolition of the concept of “illegitimacy” in Canadian law.35   
Children are thus now entitled to the same legal treatment regardless of 
whether their parents are married, cohabiting, living separate or never 
cohabited.  However, for the purposes of establishing a parent-child 
relationship, the historical presumptions of maternity and paternity,36 
                                                          
 30. Id. at para. 6. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. at para. 18. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at para. 19. 
 35. See, e.g., SHEILA KIERAN, Farewell Filius Nullius, in THE FAMILY MATTERS: 
TWO CENTURIES OF FAMILY LAW AND LIFE IN ONTARIO 131, 139 (1986). 
 36. For example, section 4 of the Nova Scotia Birth Registration Regulations 
provides that “a woman who gives birth to a child must be recorded as the mother of 
the child.” See Birth Registration Regulations, N.S. Reg. 390/2007, § 4 (Can.).  The 
presumptions related to paternity feature more frequently in the enabling legislation.  
See, e.g., Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128, § 95 (Can.); Family Law Act, 
S.A. 2003, c. F-4.5, § 8(1) (Can.); Children’s Law Act, S.S. 1997, c. C-8.2, § 45(1) 
(Can.); Family Maintenance Act, S.M. c. F20, § 23 (Can.); Children’s Law Reform 
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, § 8 (Can.); Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 525 
(Can.); Family Services Act, S.N.B. 1980, c. F-2.2, § 103(1) (Can.); Child Status Act, 
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-6, § 9(4) (Can.); Children’s Law Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-13, § 
10(1) (Can.); Children’s Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 31, § 12(1) (Can.). 
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modified to take account of non-marital cohabitation, have been 
incorporated in some form into most provincial family law and birth 
registration statutes.  For example, in Ontario, the Children’s Law Reform 
Act provides that a “male person” is presumed to be the “father” of a child 
where: 
• he was married to the mother of the child at the time of birth; 
• he was married to the mother of the child but the marriage was 
terminated within 300 days before the birth of the child by 
reason of death, nullity or divorce; 
• he married the mother of the child following the child’s birth 
and acknowledged that he is the child’s natural father; 
• he was cohabitating with the mother of the child “in a 
relationship of some permanence” at the time the child was 
born, or the child was born within 300 days after the parties had 
ceased cohabitation; 
• he has certified the child’s birth, as the child’s father, under the 
Vital Statistics Act or equivalent legislation in another 
jurisdiction; or, 
• he was found by a “court of competent jurisdiction in Canada” 
to be the child’s father.37  
While these presumptions do serve some social and legal functions, the 
increased use of ARTs and the legalization of same-sex relationships mean 
that “presumptions about parenthood can no longer be drawn from the facts 
of either birth or marriage.”38  Further, the development of DNA testing has 
meant that a particular man’s biological paternity can now be proved—or 
disproved—with a high degree of certainty, rendering “presumptions” of 
paternity less significant. 
With regards to motherhood, a woman who gives birth to a child should 
not irrebuttably be accepted as the child’s mother, since artificial 
reproduction has enabled the distribution of the “female biological 
contribution among several women”;39 indeed, a child may have separate 
genetic, gestational, and child-rearing mothers.  In ART cases, the 
historical presumption that assigns motherhood based solely on the fact of 
having given birth may thus run contrary to the parties’ stated intentions in 
arranging for conception, potentially burdening one woman with 
responsibilities that she had not contemplated and denying another the 
parental rights she had expected to receive. 
The statutory presumptions of paternity can create difficulties for 
families who have children through assisted reproduction.  Consider the 
situation of a lesbian couple who has conceived a child by means of 
                                                          
 37. Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 12, § 8(1) (Can.). 
 38. Boyd, supra note 8, at 66. 
 39. Mykitiuk, supra note 9, at 793. 
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artificial insemination.  Although the women may have intended that the 
non-biological partner be a co-parent to the child, the traditional 
presumptions of paternity, unmodified in some of the current provincial 
legislation, make no allowance for a woman’s female partner; rather, the 
text of the provisions generally refer to “a male person” as being the child’s 
other parent or “father.”  The lack of gender-neutral language denies a 
woman’s same-sex spouse the right to be regarded as a co-parent to the 
child she helped plan and, indeed, meant to parent.  Thus, the traditional 
assumptions related to paternity offer such lesbian couples who are 
attempting to start a family no basis on which “to establish a bond of 
filiation between [the non-biological mother] and the child.”40 
As will be discussed in more detail below, Canadian legislation and 
jurisprudence have begun to address some of the issues that arise from 
ARTs.  It should be noted that the partner of a biological parent who is not 
within the statutory definition of “parent” can still claim significant rights 
as a parent by “standing in the place of a parent.”  Thus, in the case of a 
lesbian family, although the child will already have a biological mother and 
father (perhaps a known sperm donor), if the mother’s same-sex partner has 
assumed a parental role by financially supporting and caring for the child, 
she may well be found to be “standing in the place of a parent.”  Although 
this would not give her full parental rights, were she to separate from her 
partner she might be able to gain custody of or access to the child.41  Using 
this approach, however, is not wholly satisfactory: relegating one intended 
parent to a “parent-like status” rather than a fully recognized legal status of 
parent may be considered unacceptable for partners who have together 
embarked on the journey to parenthood even before conception.42 
D.  Adoption—An Evolving Institution and a Changing Concept of 
Parenthood 
Although the concept of adoption was not recognized at common law,43 
by the nineteenth century legal arrangements were often made for the care 
of children whose parents had died: wealthy orphans were typically 
                                                          
 40. Robert Leckey, The Practices of Lesbian Mothers and Quebec’s Reforms, 23 
CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 579, 585 (2011). 
 41. See Bala, supra note 10, at 56; see also, e.g., Buist v. Greaves, [1997] O.J. no. 
2646, para. 23 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.) (noting how even before the acceptance of same-sex 
marriage, Canadian courts recognized that the lesbian partner of a woman who 
conceived a child through artificial insemination “should have parental status, 
including the right to seek access or custody, and an obligation of child support” and 
stating that the rationale for such recognition lay in the fact that the woman had 
“clearly ‘demonstrated a settled intent’ to parent by providing consent to the 
insemination”). 
 42. See generally Leckey, supra note 40.  
 43. THEODORE G. GIESBRECHT, Adoption, in CANADIAN CHILD WELFARE LAW: 
CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND THE STATE 155, 155 (Nicholas Bala et al. eds., 2004). 
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assigned a guardian to manage their assets and provide for their care, while 
children of lesser means were placed in religious orphanages or were 
“apprenticed out” to families who had them work from a young age on 
farms or in family businesses.44  In Canada, provincial adoption laws were 
enacted to find parents for “illegitimate children” (those born out of 
wedlock) during and immediately after World War I when there was a 
significant increase in the number of births to single women.  Traditionally, 
such adoptions were usually “shrouded in secrecy” as for the unwed mother 
there was the harsh stigma associated with having borne a child out of 
wedlock and, for the adoptive parents, there was shame attached to the 
inability to produce biological children.45  Early adoptions resulted in the 
complete severance of all ties to the biological relatives and the “rebirth” of 
the child to the adoptive parents.46  To accomplish this, adoption records 
were often sealed, and a new birth certificate was issued that identified the 
adoptive parents as the biological parents.47  As a result, adult adoptees 
who wanted to locate their biological relatives had no legal recourse, and 
they faced many practical obstacles when they tried to do so by searching 
old newspaper records, yearbooks, and other sources.48 
Adoption in Canada has changed significantly over the past half century.  
With the advent of improved birth control and relatively easy access to 
abortion, as well the provision of social assistance to the mothers of 
children born out of wedlock, since about 1970 there have been fewer 
healthy newborn infants available for adoption in Canada than parents 
willing to adopt them.49  This has given rise to changes in adoption patterns 
in Canada, including the introduction of international adoption.  With this 
greater “demand” for children to adopt has come a willingness to give 
greater rights to birth parents—indeed, it is now common to give birth 
parents a role in the selection of adoptive parents, generally on an 
anonymized basis.  There is also a recognition that in some cases biological 
parents can have a role in the lives of their children after adoption, thus 
changing the concept of “parenthood” for both biological and adoptive 
parents, as well as for adopted children.  There has been a growing 
acceptance of “open adoptions,” where the full legal rights and obligations 
of parenthood are transferred to the adoptive parents, but there remains 
                                                          
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 156. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 162 (noting that child welfare agencies often experience considerable 
difficulty in finding adoptive parents for older or special needs children and so may be 
“more willing to consider single persons and gay or lesbian partners for these ‘hard-to-
place’ children,” since many of the “traditional adoptive parents” are loath to take such 
children).  
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some degree of contact with the birth parents,50 ranging from the provision 
of an annual letter to fairly regular visits.  While there is a clear need for 
more research into the extent and effects of open adoption in Canada, the 
practice appears to be fairly widespread within the realm of domestic 
adoptions.51  Although there is great variation in the extent of post-adoption 
contact with biological parents, there appear to be few problems with open 
adoptions, with the arrangements giving the adoptive parents full legal 
rights and responsibilities, and children having their psychological bonds 
rooted in their adoptive families, but some contact with the biological 
parents continuing. 
A number of issues have arisen in the specific context of ARTs and 
adoption.  For instance, one problem that has had pronounced effects for 
gay and lesbian couples who use ARTs is step-parent adoption.  Canadian 
statutes generally relax the requirements that govern the adoption of 
children by relatives of a biological parent (like grandparents) or by the 
“spouse” of a biological parent (traditionally, a step-father).  Thus, 
although ordinarily home studies, probationary periods, and the 
involvement of a child welfare agency or licensee are necessary to screen a 
potential adoptive parent, these requirements are generally waived in the 
case of an adoption by a step-parent.52  Most step-parent adoptions occur in 
situations where a biological father has had little to no involvement in a 
child’s life, and consequently, the child has developed a close relationship 
with his or her mother’s new husband.53 
Until relatively recently, the definition of “spouse” contained in most 
Canadian adoption legislation made it very difficult for same-sex partners 
to adopt their spouses’ biological children.  Typically, such cases involved 
a child who had been conceived through the use of artificial insemination 
and had lived with the biological mother and her partner since birth.  The 
inability of a woman to adopt the biological child of her partner was 
addressed in the 1995 Ontario case of Re K.54  A group of lesbian partners 
challenged the under-inclusiveness of the definition of “spouse” contained 
in the Child and Family Services Act, which precluded them from using the 
step-parent provisions to adopt their partners’ biological children.55  Nevins 
J. deemed the exclusion to be an unconstitutional violation of section 15 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms since it discriminated against 
                                                          
 50. Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-11, §§ 153.1–153.6 (Can.). 
 51. See Charlene E. Miali & Karen March, Open Adoption as a Family Form: 
Community Assessments and Social Support, 26 J. FAM. ISSUES 380 (2005), for one of 
the few Canadian research articles on this subject. 
 52. GIESBRECHT, supra note 43, at 165. 
 53. Id. at 166. 
 54. Re K. (1995), 23 O.R. 3d 679 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.). 
 55. Id. 
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the petitioners on the basis of their sexual orientation.56  The definition was 
also found to be contrary to the best interests of the children.57  Legislation 
in a number of provinces has now been amended to explicitly allow for 
same-sex partners to have “relative” adoptions, and in other provinces this 
has become an accepted practice based on the ruling in Re K.58 
In light of the fact that it is now possible for the spouse of a biological 
parent to adopt a child conceived through ARTs in order to assume full 
parental status, another significant issue which has had ramifications for 
same-sex couples and others who use these technologies relates to the 
consent of the biological parent to an adoption.  In all Canadian provinces, 
the consent of every legal “parent” is required for a valid adoption, unless 
there are strong reasons that would justify a court dispensing with 
consent.59 However, in no Canadian jurisdiction does the definition of 
“parent” for the purposes of consent to an adoption include a semen donor 
who has provided no care for a child after birth.   
The question of dispensing with the consent of a biological father who 
acted as a semen donor may arise even where there was an intent to include 
him in parenting the child, as occurred in the 2009 Ontario case of C (M.A.) 
v. K (M.).60  The child at issue had been conceived through artificial 
insemination with the sperm of a homosexual donor who was known by the 
mother and her partner.61  After the child’s birth, the parties entered into a 
written agreement respecting the care and support of the child.62  The 
father, who had his own same-sex spouse, enjoyed regular access.63  As the 
child grew, the father sought more access and consequently, relations 
between the lesbian couple and the father deteriorated.64  When the child 
was six years of age, the women decided that the biological mother’s 
partner should adopt the child, so that she could enjoy the same rights as a 
biological parent.65  The father refused to consent to the adoption.66  The 
couple responded with an application to dispense with his consent, arguing 
that their social position as lesbian parents rendered their need to have the 
partner pronounced a legal parent more urgent than it would be for a 
                                                          
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. GIESBRECHT, supra note 43, at 176. 
 60. M.A.C. v. M.K., 2009 ONCJ 18 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.). 
 61. Id. at para. 9. 
 62. Id. at para. 14. 
 63. Id. at para. 12. 
 64. Id. at para. 17. 
 65. Id. at para. 3. 
 66. Id. at para. 6. 
13
Bala and Ashbourne: The Widening Concept of Parent in Canada: Step-Parents, Same-Sex
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012
  
538 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:3 
heterosexual couple.67  The father claimed that if the court allowed the 
order, the applicants would marginalize him from his child’s life, and that 
he would in effect be reduced to “little more than a friendly uncle.”68 
The court denied the applicants’ request to dispense with the need for the 
father’s consent, and hence refused the adoption.  The judge found the 
father to be a “loving, involved” parent, and noted that the agreement 
specified that it had been the parties’ common intention that he would 
remain an active participant in the child’s life.69  Cohen J. ruled that 
adoption was not necessary to reinforce the non-biological mother’s 
position as a parent, as the parties’ agreement already made clear that she 
was a custodial parent.70  Finally, the judge determined that allowing the 
adoption to proceed would be contrary to the child’s best interests: “the 
effect would be to undermine [the child]’s sense of her place in the world, 
her confidence in her experience of the world and her understanding of 
who her family is.”71 
II.  RESPONDING TO ART—THE CHANGING DEFINITION OF “PARENT” 
A.  Provincial  Legislative Reforms 
1.  Assisted Conception 
A number of Canadian provinces have enacted legislation that directly 
addresses some of the issues created by ARTs.  While these statutes 
represent important steps forward in recognizing the new parental 
relationships that have developed as a result of these technologies, some 
Canadian jurisdictions have yet to introduce such laws.  Further, there are 
significant deficiencies in much of the existing legislation, leaving lawyers 
and judges to deal with these complex issues without adequate legislative 
guidance. 
In 1988, Newfoundland became the first province to enact family 
legislation that directly addressed ARTs, with section 12 of the Children’s 
Law Act outlining presumptions of parenthood where a child was 
                                                          
 67. Id. at para. 7. 
 68. Id. at para. 6. 
 69. Id.  This common intention was reflected not only in the parties’ written 
agreement, but also in the couple’s decision to opt for a known sperm donor rather than 
an anonymous one. 
 70. Id. at para. 29. 
 71. Id. at para. 64.  Elaine Craig has argued that this case should be regarded as an 
excellent example of the fact that the feminist and queer legal theories—often 
portrayed as hostile and incompatible—can be reconciled, with the result that both 
schools of thought can advance their respective projects and values.  See Elaine Craig, 
Converging Feminist and Queer Legal Theories, Family Feuds and Family Ties, 28 
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 209, 216-19 (2010). 
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conceived by means of artificial insemination.72  The Children’s Law Act 
only dealt with the issue of the insemination of a man’s female partner with 
another man’s semen.  It specifies that “a man” is to be “considered in law” 
to be the “father” of a child that results from his wife or cohabiting 
partner’s artificial insemination if he “consents in advance” to the 
insemination.73  The Children’s Law Act also provides that a semen donor 
who is not married to or cohabiting with a woman who is artificially 
inseminated with his semen “is not in law the father of the resulting 
child.”74 
Legislation enacted in Prince Edward Island in 2008 also addressed 
ARTs75 in a somewhat more progressive way than the earlier enacted law 
in Newfoundland.  Section 9(5) of the Child Status Act76 provides that “a 
person” will be “presumed” to be the parent of a child born by means of 
assisted conception if, at the time the mother was inseminated, he or she 
was the spouse of, or was cohabitating in a conjugal relationship with the 
mother.77  This presumption can be rebutted if it is shown that the person 
did not consent in advance to the insemination and did not demonstrate a 
settled intention to treat the child as his or her own after birth,78 or if the 
person did not know that the child was created through assisted 
conception.79  It is important to note that the Prince Edward Island statute 
uses gender-inclusive language, enabling a birth mother’s male or female 
partner to gain status as the child’s parent.  However, the Child Status Act 
fails to address situations where a genetic mother is intended to be the 
parent of a child conceived through assisted conception, and the woman 
who gives birth to the child is meant only to act as the gestational, or 
surrogate, carrier.  This legislation also only allows a child to have two 
parents from the time of birth, thus failing to address situations that 
commonly arise within the gay and lesbian community80—situations where 
a child has two mothers (the biological mother and her spouse, who acts as 
a co-parent) as well as a father (the known sperm donor). 
In Alberta, the Family Law Act, which first came into force in 2005, (the 
2005 Alberta Family Law Act), addressed artificial reproduction by means 
                                                          
 72. Children’s Law Act, S. Nfld. 1988, c. 61, § 12 (Can.). 
 73. Id. § 12(3). 
 74. Children’s Law Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-13, § 12(6) (Can.). 
 75. See Child Status Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-6 (Can.). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. § 9(5). 
 78. Id. § 9(5)(a). 
 79. Id. § 9(5)(b). 
 80. Fiona Kelly, Nuclear Norms or Fluid Families? Incorporating Lesbian and 
Gay Parents and Their Children into Canadian Family Law, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 133, 
161 (2004). 
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of a surrogate or gestational carrier, as well as artificial insemination.  In its 
earlier form, the statute was written in gender-specific terms, and without 
reference to the possibility of same-sex partners becoming parents. 
Thus, for example, section 13 of the 2005 Alberta Family Law Act 
governed instances of “assisted conception,” defined as “the fertilization by 
a male person’s sperm of a female person’s egg by means other than sexual 
intercourse,” and included “fertilization of a female person’s egg outside of 
her uterus and subsequent implantation of the fertilized egg into her 
uterus.”81  Subsection 13(2) provided that a “male person” was deemed the 
father of a child if, at the time of the assisted conception, he was the spouse 
of, or was in “a relationship of interdependence of some permanence” with 
the woman who was inseminated, and his sperm was used in the process.82  
Where the man’s sperm was not used in the assisted conception, he was the 
child’s legal father where it could be shown that he agreed in advance of 
the conception to act as a parent to the ensuing child.83  The problem with 
this provision was that if the biological mother was in a same-sex 
relationship, her partner, although she may have consented in advance to 
becoming a parent, was effectively excluded from attaining parental status 
since the section applied only to a “male person.”84  The gender-specific 
language of this provision was the subject of a constitutional challenge in 
Fraess v. Alberta.85  The petitioner’s same-sex spouse had been artificially 
inseminated with the sperm of an anonymous donor.86  She argued that the 
impugned section conferred a “significant benefit” on heterosexual couples 
while it forced lesbian spouses to “engage in a separate and protracted 
process” of adoption in order to achieve parental status.87  Clarke J. 
determined that the legislation violated the equality guarantee contained in 
section 15 of the Charter.88  The court observed that this provision “makes 
available the benefit of parental status only to male persons”—that is, a 
person “married or partnered in [a] relationship of the opposite sex to the 
biological mother.”89  The court declared that subsection 13(2) should be 
read to provide that: 
A person is the parent of the resulting child if at the time of an assisted 
conception the person was the spouse of [or] in a relationship of 
                                                          
 81. Child Status Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-6, § 13(1) (Can.). 
 82. See id. § 13(2)(a) (maintaining that this remains the case even where the man’s 
sperm was mixed with that of another male person). 
 83. Id. § 13(2)(b). 
 84. Id. 
 85. 2005 ABQB 889 (Can. Alta. Q.B.). 
 86. Id. at para. 2. 
 87. Id. at para. 3. 
 88. Id. at para. 6. 
 89. Id. at para. 5. 
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interdependence of some permanence with the female person and . . . the 
person consented in advance of the conception to being a parent of the 
resulting child.90 
In response to this litigation and the development of new concepts, in 
2011 the Alberta legislature enacted new legislation governing parental 
relationships that arise from ARTs, using gender-neutral language and 
recognizing both same and opposite-sex partners of parents who provide 
embryos or human reproductive material. 91  Section 5.1 of the new Family 
Law Act provides that “‘assisted reproduction’ means a method of 
conceiving other than by sexual intercourse” and further specifies that, for 
the purposes of the Act “if a child is born as a result of assisted 
reproduction, the child’s conception is deemed to have occurred at the time 
the procedure that resulted in the implantation of the human reproductive 
material or embryo was performed.”  With respect to the determination of 
parentage, there is a presumption that, unless “the contrary is proven,” a 
person who is “married to or in a conjugal relationship of interdependence 
of some permanence with the birth mother at the time of the child’s 
conception” has consented to the conception and is a legal parent of that 
child.92  While this new legislation allows for voluntary surrogacy 
agreements and uses concepts and terminology that recognize same-sex 
parenting, it limits a child to having two legal parents (though it also 
recognizes the possibility of non-parental guardianship with a more 
restricted set of rights). 
Like Alberta, Quebec has also enacted a comprehensive statutory regime 
to govern ARTs.  This legislation is generally respectful of familial 
diversity, especially with regards to lesbian partners.  This is not wholly 
surprising since Quebec is, in many ways, North America’s most 
progressive jurisdiction (and also has the highest tax rates); for example, in 
1977 it was the first jurisdiction to prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation,93 and it has the widest access to public subsidized daycare on 
this continent.  In 2002, the Quebec Civil Code was amended94 to establish 
Canada’s most comprehensive regime regarding ARTs, with Articles 538 
through 542 now governing the filiation of children born through assisted 
conception.  Article 538 provides that a “parental project involving assisted 
                                                          
 90. Id. at para. 16 (emphasis added). 
 91. Family Law Act, S.A. 2003, c. F-4.5, §§ 8.1, 8.2.  For an explanation of the 
new provisions, see Government of Alberta, Justice and Attorney General, 
Amendments to the Family Law Act – What’s New? (Jan. 26, 2011), 
http://justice.alberta.ca/programs_services/families/Documents/familyLawActAmendm
ents.pdf.  
 92. Family Law Act, § 8.1(6).   
 93. See generally Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1977, c. 6 (Can.) (amending the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). 
 94. Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 2002, c. 6, § 30 (Can.). 
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procreation exists from the moment a person alone decides or spouses by 
mutual consent decide . . . to resort to the genetic material of a person who 
is not party to the parental project” in order to have a child.95  While parties 
may have a written agreement, oral arrangements may also be made and 
given legal effect.96  A person who contributes their genetic material for the 
purpose of realizing a “third-party parental project does not create any bond 
of filiation” with the resulting child;97 thus donors of semen and ova do not 
become parents if they do not intend to have that status. 
The Quebec regime gives clear parental status to a non-biological 
intended parent.  Article 539.1 specifically addresses the situation of 
lesbian partners, providing that if “both parents are women, the rights and 
obligations assigned by law to the father, insofar as they differ from the 
mother’s, are assigned to the mother who did not give birth to the child.”98 
The Quebec statute does not permit three persons to be legal parents, so 
that a lesbian couple who chooses to have a child by a known donor must 
decide whether the donor or the biological parent’s partner will be the other 
parent.99  A man may contribute to a “parental project” for a couple who 
wishes to have a child either by providing semen for artificial insemination, 
or by means of sexual intercourse.100  However, if sexual intercourse is 
used for the “parental project,” the man may seek a declaration of filiation 
(parentage) from a court during the first year of the child’s life based on his 
biological paternity; in this situation, the biological father will displace the 
biological mother’s partner as the child’s other legal parent.101 
The legislative framework in Quebec thus generally defers to the intent 
of the parents involved at the time of conception when determining 
parentage.102  However, Article 541 prohibits surrogacy agreements, 
stipulating that “any agreement whereby a woman undertakes to procreate 
or carry a child for another person is absolutely null.”103  This provision has 
created problems for children who are the products of a surrogacy 
agreement.  In one Quebec case, an infertile couple found a woman willing 
                                                          
 95. See Leckey, supra note 40, at 584, 591 (arguing that the lack of formality 
necessary to give rise to a parental project finds “little support” in the practices of 
lesbian parents, who are likely to carefully plan for the conception of a child and will 
generally want a clear written agreement that sets out the expectations of a known 
donor); see also Robert Leckey, Where the Parents Are of the Same Sex: Quebec’s 
Reforms to Filiation, 23 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 62 (2009). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 538.2 (Can.). 
 98. Id. art. 539.1. 
 99. Id. art. 538.2. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Campbell, supra note 17, at 242, 260.  
 103. Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 541 (Can.). 
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to act as a surrogate in exchange for $20,000.  She was subsequently 
artificially inseminated with the man’s semen, and after the birth gave the 
child up to the couple and surrendered all her legal rights regarding the 
child.  However, in the uncontested adoption proceeding, the judge refused 
to allow the man’s wife to adopt the child, effectively leaving the child 
with only one legal parent.104 
Thus, while the Quebec regime is generally sensitive to the interests of 
lesbian partners who wish to use ARTs, the prohibition on surrogacy 
agreements may have a discriminatory effect on gay partners who want to 
forge an agreement with a woman to have a child of which one of the men 
is the biological father and which the same-sex partners plan to parent 
together. 
2.  Birth Registration 
A number of provinces have amended their vital statistics legislation to 
enable persons other than the biological mother and father to be registered 
as parents if the child was conceived through ART.  Although the 
information listed on a child’s birth certificate does not definitively 
establish legal parentage, “[birth] certificates nevertheless provide 
presumptive proof of parent-child relationships and are required for 
numerous legal and social activities.”105  It is thus practically and legally 
valuable for any person who intends to be a parent to be listed on the 
child’s birth certificate. 
In Ontario, subsection 2(2)2 of the Regulations to the Vital Statistics 
Act, proclaimed in 2006, allows, in the context of assisted conception, a 
child’s mother and “the other parent” of the child to certify the child’s 
birth.106  This gender-neutral language was inserted as a result of a 
constitutional challenge launched by four lesbian couples to the previous 
version of the Regulations, which enabled only “the mother and the father” 
to be registered as the parents of the child.107  In Rutherford v. Ontario 
                                                          
 104. In the Matter of X - Adoption – 091, 2009 QCCQ 628, [2009] R.J.Q. 445 (Can. 
Que. Youth Ct.); see also Born to Surrogate, Child Has No Legal Mother, Quebec 
Judge Rules, CBC NEWS, Mar. 11, 2009, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2009/03/11/mtl-surrogate-baby-quebec-
0311.html.  However, for an example of cases where judges were more sympathetic to 
the interests of children, see In the Matter of X - Adoption – 09184,  2009 QCCQ 9058, 
 [2009] R.J.Q. 2694 (Can. Que. Youth Ct.) (allowing an uncontested adoption to 
proceed involving an altruistic surrogate who was the aunt of the woman seeking to 
adopt); In the Matter of X - Adoption – 09367, (2009) [2010] R.D.F. 387 (Can. Que. 
Youth Ct.) (noting that the surrogacy agreement was entered into in California, where 
such agreements are legal). 
 105. Boyd, supra note 8, at 74. 
 106. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1094, § 2(2).2 (Can.); see, e.g., McDonagh v. Mahallati, 
[2010] ONSC 4986, para. 13 (Can.) (listing the same-sex partner of the biological 
mother as the child’s “other parent” on the registered Statement of Live Birth). 
 107. Vital Statistics Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. V.4 (Can.). 
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(Deputy Registrar General),108 Rivard J. determined that this legislative 
scheme discriminated against “lesbian co-mothers”—who could not be 
registered on their children’s statement of live birth—on the basis of both 
sex and sexual orientation, contrary to section 15 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms.109  He contrasted their situation with that of a non-
biological father whose spouse had conceived using artificial insemination: 
the legislation enabled such a man to be registered as a parent on the 
statement of live birth, whereas the applicants could not.110  Rivard J. 
remarked that in light of the growing use of reproductive technologies, the 
Vital Statistics Act was “clearly outdated,”111 as well as unconstitutional.  
As noted above, the government of Ontario responded by amending the 
birth registration regulations. 
Nova Scotia also modified its Birth Registration Regulations in 2007 to 
address issues raised by children “conceived as the result of assisted 
conception.”112  If a biological mother is married, the registration of birth 
“must indicate the mother’s spouse” as the child’s other parent, though this 
includes a same-sex spouse.113  If the biological mother is not married, but 
she acknowledges another “person” as the child’s parent and that “person” 
files a declaration of intent “to assume the role of parent of the child,” the 
birth certificate is to be registered indicating that other person as the child’s 
other parent.114  This provision, phrased in gender-neutral terms, represents 
a positive step forward:115 it enables a woman who has given birth to list 
her same-sex partner on the child’s birth certificate as a co-parent.  Section 
5 of the Nova Scotia Birth Regulations governs situations of assisted 
conception through surrogacy.  Subsection 5(2) enables the “intended 
parents” in a “surrogacy arrangement” to apply to a court for a “declaratory 
order of parentage” if all of the following conditions are met: the surrogacy 
arrangement was initiated by the intended parents; it was planned before 
conception; the woman acting as the surrogate has no intention of acting as 
the child’s parent; the intended parents intend to be the child’s parents; and 
one of the intended parents has a genetic link to the child.116  This section 
can be used by either a heterosexual or homosexual couple who have 
                                                          
 108. Rutherford v. Ontario (2006), 81 O.R. 3d 81, para. 123 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
 109. Id. at para. 104. 
 110. Id. at para. 113. 
 111. Id. at para. 31. 
 112. Birth Registration Regulations, N.S. Reg. 390/2007 (Can.). 
 113. Id. § 3(1). 
 114. Id. § 3(2). 
 115. See Mykitiuk, supra note 9, at 790 (arguing that the use of gender-neutral terms 
should not be regarded as a positive reform; rather, that such language “treats parents 
as fungible and risks marginalizing the gendered aspects of legal norms that continue to 
influence legal reasoning”). 
 116. Birth Registration Regulations, N.S. Reg. 390/2007, § 5(2) (Can.). 
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conceived by means of a surrogate mother.117 
A number of other provinces, such as Manitoba118 and British 
Columbia,119 amended their vital statistics laws to specifically acknowledge 
that the “spouse” or unmarried cohabitant of the mother of a child who was 
conceived as a result of artificial insemination with the consent of that 
person is a parent.  Although these laws now allow the lesbian partner of a 
biological mother to be registered as a parent, they do not deal with more 
complex issues related to ARTs. 
B.  Federal  Legislation: The Assisted Human Reproduction Act120 
By the late 1980s, there was great controversy in Canada about a range 
of issues associated with ARTs and the fact that there was no legislation to 
address them.  The federal government responded by establishing the Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies to address a range of 
interrelated contentious issues.121  The analysis of the Royal Commission, 
at least in part, “reflected most popular and academic feminist thinking in 
Canada and the United States in the 1980s and early 1990s,”122 as well as 
deep moral concerns about the commercialization of gamete donation, and 
thus recommended a prohibition on payments to semen and ova donors.  
The Commission’s Report was released in 1993 and eventually led to the 
enactment of the federal Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHR Act) in 
2004.123  While the AHR Act does not purport to define who is to be 
regarded as a legal parent of a child (since this is a matter of provincial 
jurisdiction), it closely regulates some important aspects of ARTs, and so 
warrants some consideration here.  Overall, the AHR Act has had a 
significant negative impact on those seeking to use ARTs in Canada, and a 
disproportionate effect on lesbians who want to use artificial insemination. 
                                                          
 117. Compare Family Law Act, S.A. 2003, c. F-4.5, § 12(5) (providing that a 
genetic donor—defined as a woman who provides her eggs for fertilization—can apply 
for an order declaring her to be the parent of the child; however, this cannot be said to 
apply to a same-sex male couple, since regardless of which partner provided the genetic 
material, neither could supply an egg for fertilization), with Birth Registration 
Regulations, N.S. Reg. 390/2007, § 5(2) (Can.) (stipulating that the “intended parents,” 
without reference to their sex or gametes, can apply for an order declaring them to be 
the parents). 
 118. The Vital Statistics Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. V60, § 3(6) (Can.). 
 119. Vital Statistics Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 479, § 4, amended by S.B.C. 2002, c. 15  
(Can.). 
 120. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.). 
 121. ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECH., PROCEED WITH CARE: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, 
Vol. 2 (1993). 
 122. Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting The Handmaid’s Tale: Feminist 
Theory Meets Empirical Research on Surrogate Mothers, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 13, 16–17 
(2010).  
 123. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.). 
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The AHR Act opens with a set of declarations, including the statement 
that “persons” who seek to make use of assisted reproductive technologies 
are not to be discriminated against, including on the basis of sexual 
orientation or marital status.124  Section 6 bans certain acts in relation to 
surrogacy arrangements, including paying a female person to act as a 
gestational carrier,125 accepting any form of payment or consideration for 
arranging the services of a surrogate,126 and counseling or inducing a 
female person to act as a surrogate mother where there is reason to believe 
she is under twenty-one-years of age.127  The sale of gametes, embryos and 
other reproductive material is prohibited for all purposes.128  Section 12 
provides that donors of semen or ova can only be reimbursed for 
“reasonable expenses” incurred as a result of their donation and specifies 
that these amounts are to be governed by the regulations.129  No such 
regulations have ever been proclaimed, making any payments to a donor at 
best a questionable practice, but more likely illegal. 
In 2007, the Attorney General of Quebec challenged the constitutionality 
of much of the Reproduction Act, arguing that it trespassed on provincial 
jurisdiction as set out in section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.130  The 
Quebec Court of Appeal ruled in 2008 that most of the Reproduction Act 
was ultra vires the jurisdiction of the federal government, since its primary 
effect was the regulation of medical practice and research, matters that 
come under the provincial heads of power.131  In December 2010, a badly 
divided Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal of the Attorney 
General of Canada in part,132 ruling that important portions of the 
Reproduction Act were valid federal law.  While a majority of the Court 
accepted that some parts of the law were unconstitutional infringements on 
the provincial power over health care, most importantly for present 
purposes, it was also accepted that the prohibitions on payment were a 
valid exercise of the federal power over the criminal law.133  Chief Justice 
Beverley McLachlin wrote: 
Parliament has a strong interest in ensuring that basic moral standards 
govern the creation and destruction of life, as well as their impact on 
                                                          
 124. Id. § 2(e). 
 125. Id. § 6(1). 
 126. Id. § 6(2)-(3). 
 127. Id. § 6(4). 
 128. Id. § 7. 
 129. Id. § 12. 
 130. Québec (Procureur général) c. Canada (Procureur général) (2008), 298 D.L.R. 
(4th) 712 (Can. Que. C.A.). 
 131. Id. 
 132. See generally Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 (Can.). 
 133. Id. 
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persons like donors and mothers.  Taken as a whole, the Act seeks to 
divert serious damage to the fabric of our society by prohibiting practices 
that tend to devalue human life and degrade participants.134 
While the stated commitment to the health and well-being of women and 
children,135 as well as the preservation of “the integrity of the human 
genome,”136 are important and worthy objectives, there are very significant 
concerns about the effects this statute has for those seeking to use ARTs—
particularly, the disproportionate effect it has on lesbians seeking artificial 
insemination in Canada.  In this vein, Canadian law professor Angela 
Cameron has argued that the Reproduction Act has restricted “some of the 
most prevalent forms of queer families.”137  Indeed, a central concern is 
that the Reproduction Act appears to prohibit “at home self-insemination,” 
which lesbian couples often choose to undertake using fresh semen from a 
known donor.138  Like many scholars, Cameron also criticizes the 
restrictions on surrogacy: the legislation specifies that those who need to 
use the services of a surrogate mother can only provide her with those 
“reasonable expenses” related to her pregnancy, which are to be more 
precisely defined in the yet-to-be-proclaimed regulations.139  Consequently, 
apart from relatively rare cases of altruistic surrogacy, Canadians who need 
a surrogate are either forced to go to the United States or to other 
jurisdictions where compensation is permitted, or are making payments to 
surrogates in Canada that are leading to a “grey (or black) market.”  These 
agreements for payment are usually honored, but certainly are 
unenforceable, and could in theory result in sanction if their existence 
became known to the authorities.140  However, there are no reported cases 
of prosecutions. 
The prohibition on payments for semen has led to a severe shortage of 
semen donors in Canada.  A recent report prepared by an infertility doctor 
for the federal agency responsible for artificial reproduction issues in 
Canada estimated that there is a need for more than 5,500 donor sperm 
inseminations a year—approximately 3,000 for lesbian couples, 1,300 for 
single women and 1,200 for heterosexual couples.141  “Altruistic” Canadian 
                                                          
 134. Id. at para. 61. 
 135. Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, § 2(a), (c) (Can.). 
 136. Id. § 2(g). 
 137. Angela Cameron, Regulating the Queer Family: The Assisted Human 
Reproduction Act, 24 CAN. J. FAM. L. 101, 101 (2008). 
 138. Id.; see also Fiona Kelly, An Alternative Conception: The Legality of Home 
Insemination under Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 26 CAN. J. FAM. L. 
149 (2010).  
 139. See Cameron, supra note 137, at 116. 
 140. See, e.g., Paid Surrogacy Driven Underground in Canada, CBC NEWS (May 2, 
2007), http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/story/2007/05/01/surrogates-pay.html. 
 141. Tom Blackwell, Too Few Men Willing to Give Away Sperm: Study, THE NAT’L 
POST, Mar. 1, 2011. 
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donors are providing less than 10% of the required semen, leaving fertility 
clinics to import (and of course pay for) frozen semen from the United 
States to meet the needs of the vast majority of women seeking 
insemination.  While this type of purchase may not directly violate the 
prohibition in the Reproduction Act that bans compensation to semen 
donors in Canada, it does make a mockery of the concept of altruistic 
donation and increases the cost and inconvenience for women seeking 
artificial insemination.  It also denies women access to fresh semen. 
III.  ARTS, PARENTHOOD AND THE COURTS 
The existing Canadian statutory frameworks—even those that have been 
recently amended—do not adequately address all of the issues related to 
children conceived using ARTs.  The ambiguity and incompleteness of 
these legislative schemes has created challenges for lawyers advising 
clients and for judges dealing with cases and who attempt to make 
reasoned, fair judgments that take account not only of the parties’ 
intentions, but also the best interests of the child.  The following survey of 
Canadian cases on parenthood and ARTs examines how the courts, lacking 
a proper legislative compass, have grappled with some of the difficult 
questions that have been posed to them. 
A.  Opposite-Sex Partners as Parents 
1.  Single Mothers 
The first reported Canadian cases that dealt with ART issues involved 
opposite-sex parents where the woman was artificially inseminated.  These 
decisions illustrate a judicial reluctance to allow heterosexual women who 
have conceived through artificial insemination while cohabiting with a 
male partner to parent on their own, even if that was their original intent.142  
Indeed, in some cases where there was no clear legislation governing 
situations of assisted reproduction, the courts proved resistant to a woman’s 
plans to parent independently, often resorting to the traditional 
presumptions of paternity and related provisions to ‘find’ a father for the 
child. 
In the 1995 Ontario case of Zegota v. Zegota-Rzegocinski,143 a husband 
and wife initially tried to conceive a child naturally, and then later through 
artificial insemination with the husband’s sperm.  After four years of 
                                                          
 142.  Kelly, Producing Paternity, supra note 16. 
 143. (1995), 10 R.F.L. 4th 384, paras. 2-3 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.). For a similar case, see 
Low v. Low (1994), 114 D.L.R. 4th 709 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.) (holding that the husband of 
a woman who conceived via artificial insemination through an anonymous sperm donor 
is the legal father of the child even though the couple separated the day they brought 
the baby home from the hospital). 
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marriage, the woman eventually resorted to artificial insemination with 
donor sperm, and after three years of trying, became pregnant.144  Although 
the husband had consented to the procedures, there was evidence to suggest 
that throughout the process he was less than supportive, at one point even 
acknowledging that he “needed time to consider the fact that his wife 
would be impregnated by the sperm of another man.”145  There was clearly 
considerable tension in the relationship by the time of conception, due at 
least in part to the stress of infertility, and the woman claimed that the 
“marriage had failed and they were in fact separated” by the time of 
conception.146  Indeed, the parties had been living in separate residences for 
four months before the birth of the child.147  After the birth, the husband 
visited the woman in the hospital and by the time the child was one year of 
age, he was exercising regular access and paying child support pursuant to 
an interim court order.148  In the divorce proceedings, the woman sought to 
terminate her former husband’s access rights on the grounds that he was 
not the child’s biological or legal parent.149  Relying on the traditional 
presumptions of paternity contained in Ontario’s Children’s Law Reform 
Act—legislation that does not have specific provisions dealing with the use 
of ARTs—the court held that the man should be recognized as the child’s 
legal father for all purposes.150  This outcome was contrary to the pre-natal 
expectations and desires of the biological mother,151 and suggests that, in 
the absence of legislation dealing with ARTs, the courts are likely to 
operate on the presumption that a male partner who consents to the 
insemination of a woman with whom he was residing at the time of 
conception will be the legal father. 
The 2007 Alberta Court of Appeal decision in Doe v. Alberta152 also 
dealt with a woman who had conceived a child using ART and wanted to 
                                                          
 144. See Zegota, 10 R.F.L. 4th 384 (explaining that the couple married in 1984, 
entered an Artificial Insemination Programme in 1988, and the woman became 
pregnant in 1991). 
 145. Id. at para. 14. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. at paras. 7, 16 (relating that the couple has separated in December 1991, 
and the child was born in March 1992). 
 148. See id. at paras. 17, 24, 28 (describing the hospital visit by the husband along 
with a Court Order granting him access to the child each Wednesday and noting that 
monthly support payments began in October 1993). 
 149. See id. at paras. 10, 12 (noting that the wife took “the position that [the 
husband] does not qualify as a “parent” as a matter of law). 
 150. See id. at paras. 36, 37 (ordering that the man be declared the father of the child 
based on the statute which allows the court to do so where it finds a relationship 
between the father and child exists). 
 151. See id. at para. 13 (relating that the husband did not sign the consent form for 
the final procedure which resulted in the pregnancy). 
 152. See 2007 ABCA 50, Alta. L.R. 4th 14 (Can.) (stating that the woman lived with 
a long-term lover who did not share her wish to have a baby). 
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be a single parent.  The woman had become pregnant through artificial 
insemination with sperm from an anonymous donor.153  Her common-law 
partner, though supportive of her goal of having children, did not want to 
be a parent himself.154  Thus, the parties drafted a written agreement 
pursuant to which the man was to be absolved of all parental 
responsibilities and waived all parental rights; it was agreed that he would 
not stand in the place of a parent, nor would he provide financially for the 
child or assume any role as guardian.155  The Alberta Court of Appeal held 
that the parties’ agreement was not enforceable, as it was not open to the 
parties to waive the establishment of a parent-child relationship if the man 
was living with the child and assumed the role of a person standing in the 
place of a parent.156  Indeed, if the man demonstrated a “settled intention” 
to treat the child as his own, he would become a person “standing in the 
place of a parent,” and would thus assume the rights and responsibilities of 
a father under provincial law.157  The Court made this ruling in spite of the 
2005 Alberta Family Law Act’s parentage rules in situations of assisted 
conception, under which the male partner of a woman who became 
pregnant by artificial insemination by the semen of another man was 
deemed the father only if he has “a relationship of interdependence with the 
mother and a settled intention to parent” the child.158 
The Canadian feminist commentator Fiona Kelly has contended that the 
“thread” which connects the “seemingly contradictory” trends in the 
governing statutes and cases is the courts’ desire to avoid fatherless 
families.159  Judges will resort to the type of paternity—be it biological or 
social—that can be made to fit the particular circumstances of a case in 
order to impose a father on what would otherwise be a family headed by a 
single mother, and thus “reduce the number of circumstances in which 
children can become fatherless.”160  It should, however, be appreciated that 
                                                          
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. (suggesting that if the man wished to continue the relationship, even 
though he did not want to have a baby, he was still in support of the woman’s 
decision). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. at para. 9 (upholding the lower court decision that the parent-child 
relationship “cannot be ousted by even the most carefully drafted contract” (citation 
omitted)). 
 157. See id. at para. 13 (implying that the partner’s position of permanence with the 
mother could be interpreted as a “settled intention” to treat the child as his own). 
 158. Kelly, Producing Paternity, supra note 16, at 323-24.  As discussed above, the 
new Alberta Family Law Act, S.A. c F-4.5 came into effect on August 11, 2011. The 
effect of the legislation has not changed in regards to this issue. 
 159. See id. at 317 (arguing that the courts do not express a clear preference for 
biological or social fathers and inferring that that indicates a desire not to have 
fatherless families). 
 160. Id. at 321 (suggesting that determining fatherhood is more difficult for courts 
when there are competing social and biological fathers). 
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Canadian courts have not forced women—particularly, lesbians—to have 
fathers for their children.  Rather, women who arrange artificial 
insemination by an anonymous donor or a known donor who is not 
registered on the child’s birth certificate, and who do not cohabit with a 
man who plays a parental role in the planning for conception or raising of 
the child, are able to have fatherless children.  While the courts will not 
allow a woman who has in fact involved a man in planning for conception 
or raising a child to exclude him from having a parental role, in coming to 
this conclusion the courts focus on the interests of children, in terms of 
both potential payors of child support and caregivers for children. 
2.  Surrogacy Agreements 
Beyond the legal problems discussed above that are created by the 
Canadian legislative prohibitions on payment for participation in ARTs or 
surrogacy, Canadian couples who resort to surrogacy agreements to have a 
child face significant difficulties in achieving legal recognition of these 
arrangements.  However, in the absence of clear legislative prohibitions on 
surrogacy, as in Quebec, Canadian courts have been prepared to take a 
child-focused approach to recognizing parentage in the context of 
surrogacy agreements, at least where there is no evidence before the court 
of any payment or other compensation. 
In the 2003 British Columbia case of Rypkema v. British Columbia,161 
the applicants were a married couple who had a child conceived in vitro 
with the embryo implanted into a woman who had agreed to act as a 
gestational carrier without any compensation.  The couple signed an 
agreement with the woman and her husband, making clear that it was 
intended that the couple would have care of the child from birth and would 
be the sole legal parents.162  However, the Director of Vital Statistics 
refused to register the couple as the child’s birth parents as the female 
applicant was not the birth mother.163  The intended parents brought an 
application for an order declaring them to be the child’s parents, and sought 
                                                          
 161. 2003 BCSC 1784 at paras. 6-7 233 D.L.R. 4th 760 (Can.).  Compare J.C. v. 
Manitoba, 2000 MBQB 173, 151 Man. R. 2d 268 (Can.) (dismissing an application to 
presumptively declare that a woman who had her eggs implanted in a surrogate is the 
biological mother of the child prior to the birth of the child), with J.R. v. L.H., [2002] 
O.T.C. 764 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (holding that where the surrogate was just the 
gestational mother and did not contribute genetic material the intended mother, though 
not the birth mother, is entitled to be declared the biological mother of the child), and 
W.J.A Q. v A.M.A., 2011 SKQB 317, [2011] S.J. No. 528 (Can. Sk. Q.B.) (holding 
that two gay men should be recognized and registered as the parents of a child who was 
born to a woman pursuant to a confidential “gestational carrier agreement”). 
 162. See Rypkema, 2003 BCSC 1784, at para. 6 (recounting the agreement between 
the two couples where the surrogate “expressly consented to terminating and 
renouncing any and all parental rights” and “further agreed to voluntarily recognize the 
petitioners as the custodial parents of the child”). 
 163. Id. at para. 2. 
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to have this reflected on the registration of birth.164  In granting the 
requested order, Gray J. observed that including the applicants’ names on 
the child’s birth registration was important in order to guarantee them a 
meaningful and active role in the child’s life.165  Such a declaration would 
provide them with “presumptive proof of their relationship to the child” 
and would enable them to do such things as register the child in school and 
obtain airline tickets and passports for him.166  The court noted that it was 
significant that the case was not one in which it was asked “to determine 
which of two or more claimants [was] the parent,”167 since both couples 
had intended from the outset that the genetic parents would act as the 
child’s legal parents, and the surrogate had agreed to relinquish the child 
upon birth. 
In contrast, the 2005 British Columbia case of H.L.W. v. J.C.T.168 dealt 
with a surrogacy arrangement that resulted in contested litigation.  A 
couple without children advertised for a surrogate mother.169  A married 
woman with four children answered the ad, and it was agreed by the 
couple, the surrogate, and her husband that the woman would act as a 
surrogate, and that the intended parents would cover all of the woman’s 
pregnancy-related expenses, though no other compensation was to be 
paid.170  The agreement was oral, and there were later disputes about the 
exact terms, in particular about whether there was to be regular contact 
between the surrogate and the child, or only an annual report.171  However, 
in spite of these disagreements, it was anticipated that the surrogate would 
consent to the adoption of the child by the intended parents. 
The woman was artificially inseminated at her home with the intended 
father’s semen.  During the pregnancy, the intended parents gave the 
woman several thousand dollars for what were claimed to be pregnancy-
related expenses.172  A few days before the expected birth, the surrogate 
and her husband told the intended parents that they would need an 
additional $8,500 for “post-partum expenses,” which caused a rift between 
                                                          
 164. See id. at para. 3 (noting that a parent’s name on the birth certificate is 
presumptive proof that the parents can use to avoid the adoption process). 
 165. Id. at para. 31 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at para. 30. 
 168. 2005 BCSC 1679 (Can.). 
 169. See id. at para. 4 (explaining that the surrogate contacted the couple after 
finding the advertisement). 
 170. Id. at paras. 4-5. 
 171. See id. at paras. 4, 6 (detailing that the couples had exchanged a few e-mails 
prior to meeting but aside from that correspondence, they could not remember the 
terms of the agreement). 
 172. Id. at para. 9 
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the two couples.173  Following the birth, the intended parents took the child 
home from the hospital, and the genetic father and “surrogate” mother 
(who was both the gestational and genetic mother) were listed as the child’s 
parents on the registration of birth.174  Thereafter, the surrogate refused to 
consent to the adoption, and brought an application for custody.175 
At an interim hearing the judge implicitly determined that it was the 
“best interests of the child” that should govern.176  While in British 
Columbia there is a statutory presumption that a child born outside of 
marriage will be placed in the guardianship of “the mother,” the court 
eventually awarded sole interim custody to the intended parents and denied 
the surrogate mother interim access.177  The judge placed particular weight 
on the “pre-birth intentions regarding who would assume parental 
responsibilities.”178  The fact that the intended parents had cared for the 
child since birth was also important, since the court wanted to minimize the 
number of disruptions in the child’s care pending trial.179  There is no 
reported trial decision in this case, but it seems likely that after the interim 
decision the parties settled the case on terms that would see the child living 
with the intended parents, as they would have a strong continuity of care 
argument by the time the case finally made it to trial.  This case makes 
clear that greater certainty and stability will be afforded for children if the 
courts presumptively give effect to the intent of the parties at the time of 
conception, even if the parties’ arrangement is one that violates the 
provisions of the federal Reproduction Act.  In a similar vein, all of the 
above cases illustrate the difficulties created by not having legislation that 
addresses the rights of parties involved in the conception of a child through 
the use of ARTs.  While statutes might not address every possible situation 
that may arise, they can provide assistance to judges and lawyers dealing 
with these difficult cases. 
B.  Same-Sex Partners as Parents 
Until relatively recently, Canadian courts did not recognize some of the 
special issues faced by lesbian couples.180  An example of this lack of 
                                                          
 173. Id. at para. 10. 
 174. Id. at para. 2. 
 175. See id. at para. 17 (quoting the affidavit of the birth mother that “[she] will not 
consent to the adoption by the defendant, J.T.  My husband and I want to raise A.C.T. 
ourselves”). 
 176. Id. at para. 20. 
 177. Id. at para. 40. 
 178. Boyd, supra note 8, at 79. 
 179. See H.L.W., 2005 BCSC 1679, at paras. 45-46 (explaining that it would be 
better for the child if his caretakers were not changed before the trial so that if custody 
was awarded to the surrogate mother, he would only have to be moved once). 
 180. This failure on the part of the courts to adequately acknowledge the unique 
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acknowledgment was the 2005 Saskatchewan case of C. (P.) v. L. (S.),181 
where a lesbian challenged the failure to afford lesbian partners of 
biological mothers the same presumptive parental rights as male 
heterosexual partners of biological mothers.  The petitioner had been in a 
committed same-sex relationship for six years with her partner, who had 
two children from a previous heterosexual relationship.182  During the 
course of their relationship, the petitioner’s partner had engaged in an act of 
sexual intercourse with a male friend, and she had a third child as a 
result.183  The two partners and the three children lived together for more 
than two years after the birth of the child and then separated.184  The 
petitioner sought a declaration of parentage for the third child and rights of 
access to all of the children.185  The petitioner asserted that the child’s 
conception and birth were the result of a deliberate plan of action to have a 
child in their relationship, though by the time of the court application the 
biological mother contended that the child was conceived as the result of an 
“accidental and unplanned product of casual intimacy.”186 
The petitioner launched a challenge to the presumptions of paternity 
contained in section 45(1)(a) of the Saskatchewan Children’s Law Act, 
which provides that a man is presumed to be the father of a child if he was 
cohabitating with the mother at the time of birth or conception.187  The 
petitioner argued that the failure to extend this presumption to a woman 
who was cohabitating with a biological mother at the relevant time 
constituted a violation of section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.188  In denying the petitioner’s challenge, Wilkinson J. held that 
the presumption of paternity was not “based on societal stereotypes in the 
ordinary sense,” but rather, was rooted simply in the assumption that “a 
man and a woman cohabitating at a child’s conception or birth were 
                                                          
circumstances faced by planned lesbian families is likely the result of their non-
inclusion in the provincial legislation that governs the assignment of legal parentage. 
For an empirical survey of these legal and social problems currently confronting such 
family forms, see Fiona Kelly, Re(Forming) Parenthood: The Assignment of Legal 
Parentage within Planned Lesbian Families, 40 OTTAWA L. REV. 185 (2008-2009) and  
FIONA KELLY, TRANSFORMING LAW’S FAMILY: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF PLANNED 
LESBIAN MOTHERHOOD (2011). 
 181. See 2005 SKQB 502, paras. 2, 24, 73 Sask. R. 127 (Can.) (explaining that the 
law provides that a male living with a woman is presumed to be the father of the child, 
but a lesbian partner is not). 
 182. See id. at para. 1 (stating that the couple had been together from December 
1999 through January 2005). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See id. (noting that the third child was born in 2002). 
 185. Id. at paras. 2-3. 
 186. Id. at para. 1. 
 187. Children’s Law Act, S.S. 1997, c. C-8.2, § 45(1) (Can.). 
 188. C. (P.), 2005 SKQB 502 at para. 2. 
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engaging in sexual intercourse.”189  Wilkinson J. also noted that the 
petitioner’s application assumed that the legislation could enable a court to 
find that a child (or children) had more than one mother, “an assumption 
that is flawed.”190 
This 2005 decision illustrates a judicial unwillingness to recognize the 
evolving definitions of “family” and “parenthood.”  Despite the fact that a 
man in the same situation as the petitioner would have been presumptively 
deemed the child’s father, the court ruled that it could not “aspire to affect 
the fundamentals of biology that underlie the presumption purely in the 
interests of equal treatment before the law.”191  At a time when more and 
more same-sex couples are choosing to become parents, legislation which 
continues to rely on “old legal assumptions that . . . parenthood is 
congruent with birth or the fact that a man is married to or in a relationship 
with a birth mother” remains untenable.192 
Some more recent Canadian decisions have begun to acknowledge the 
new realities created by lesbian and gay parenting and ARTs.193  As 
discussed above, the court in the 2006 Ontario decision in Rutherford v. 
Ontario (Deputy Registrar General)194 took a very different approach than 
that in C. (P.) v. L. (S.), holding that a legislative scheme which did not 
allow “lesbian co-mothers” to be registered on their children’s statement of 
live birth discriminated on the basis of both sex and sexual orientation, 
contrary to section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Perhaps the most significant illustration of the wider recognition of gay 
and lesbian parenting issues is the 2007 Ontario Court of Appeal decision 
in A. (A.) v. B. (B.).195  When a lesbian couple who had been in a committed 
relationship for over a decade decided to have a child, they turned to one of 
their gay male friends, who agreed to act as a sperm donor.196  One woman 
and the man became the biological parents of the child—who was born as a 
result of artificial insemination in 2001—and were identified as such on the 
                                                          
 189. Id. at para. 20. 
 190. See id. at para. 24 (observing that the petitioner assumed the statute would 
allow a child to have more than one mother instead of challenging the statute for failing 
to allow more than one mother). 
 191. Id. at para. 20. 
 192. Boyd, supra note 8, at 65. 
 193. See Donna Bouchard, The Three-Parent Decision: A Case Commentary on 
A.A. v. B.B., 70 SASK. L. REV. 459, 474 (2007) (“A.A. v. B.B. stretches the notions of 
family and of parent.”). 
 194. See (2006), 81 O.R. 3d 81, paras. 232-33 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (finding that 
there is a pre-existing disadvantage for lesbian mothers and that registration on a 
child’s birth certificate is a core dignity). 
 195. 2007 ONCA 2, 83 O.R. 3d 561 (Can.). 
 196. See id. at para. 1 (explaining that the couple had been together since 1990 and 
decided to have a baby in 1999). 
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child’s birth certificate.197  It had been agreed from the outset by all three 
parties that the women would serve as the child’s primary caregivers, but 
that the man would remain an active participant in the child’s life.198  With 
the support of the biological parents, when the child was two years old the 
partner of the biological mother made an application to the court for a 
declaration that, in addition to the biological parents, she was also a full 
legal parent.199  She chose to pursue her parental rights via the route of a 
court declaration of parentage because if she had sought instead to adopt 
the child, this would have required the father to forfeit his parental rights as 
the child’s father, something none of the parties wanted or intended.200 
Although the trial judge recognized that making the declaration would be 
in the child’s best interests, he felt constrained by the legislation.201  
Subsection 4(1) of the Ontario Children’s Law Reform Act specified that 
any person having an interest in a child could apply for a declaration that 
they be recognized in law as “the father” or “the mother” of a child.202  The 
use of the definite article “the” was held by Aston J. to be indicative of the 
legislature’s intent—that is, that a child was to have only two parents, one 
mother and one father: “When the legislation uses a word such as ‘the,’ it is 
presumed to do so precisely and for a purpose. It represents a choice of the 
definite article over the indefinite article. Considerable weight must be 
given to its clear and ordinary meaning.”203 
This conclusion illustrates the deficiencies in much of the current 
Canadian legislation: this restrictive language denied parental status to a 
mother who participated in planning the child’s conception, and provided 
primary care from the moment of birth.  The Ontario Court of Appeal 
overturned the trial judge’s decision, holding that it was contrary to the 
child’s best interests to deprive him of the “legal recognition of parentage 
of one of his mothers.”204  Writing for the Court, Rosenberg J.A. stressed 
                                                          
 197. A.A. v. B.B. (2003) 38 R.F.L. 5th 1, paras. 1, 4-5 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
 198. Id. at para. 4. 
 199. See id. at para. 1 (noting that the applicant asked specifically to be declared a 
“mother” of the child). 
 200. See id. at para. 14 (explaining that adoption procedures require the court to 
terminate the rights of one parent in order to declare another person the parent). 
 201. See id. at para. 40 (stating that “the court is unable to repair any legislative 
shortcoming through parens patriae). 
 202. Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, § 4(1) (Can.) (emphasis 
added). 
 203. A.A., 38 R.F.L. 5th 1, at para. 34. 
 204. A.A. v. B.B., 2007 ONCA 2, para. 37, 83 O.R. 3d 561 (Can.). As discussed in 
this decision, superior courts in Canada, the United Kingdom, and some other 
Commonwealth countries have an inherent parens patriae—Latin for “parent of the 
country”—jurisdiction to make orders that advance the best interests of children in 
situations where there is a “legislative gap.”  Unlike those situations where there is a 
constitutional challenge, when exercising its parens patriae power a court clearly 
cannot override an explicit legislative provision, but only has a narrow power to “fill in 
32
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss3/7
  
2012] THE WIDENING CONCEPT OF “PARENT” IN CANADA 557 
the existence of a “gap” in the legislation and noted that the provision no 
longer accorded with modern social and familial realities: 
Present social conditions and attitudes have changed.  Advances in our 
appreciation of the value of other types of relationships and in the 
science of reproductive technology have created gaps in the CLRA’s 
legislative scheme.  Because of these changes the parents of a child can 
be two women or two men.  They are as much the child’s parents as 
adopting parents or “natural” parents.  The CLRA, however, does not 
recognize these forms of parenting and thus the children of these 
relationships are deprived of the equality of status that declarations of 
parentage provide.205  
The Court allowed the appeal and issued a declaration, pursuant to its 
parens patriae jurisdiction, that the partner of the biological mother was 
also the child’s legal mother, thus recognizing three legal parents for the 
child.206  The decision of the Court of Appeal is indicative of a progressive, 
child-focused judicial response to issues related to parenthood and ARTs; 
the Court developed a creative solution to address the limitations of 
outdated legislation in an effort to ensure that non-traditional families are 
accorded the same rights as traditional, heterosexual families. 
CONCLUSION: ARTS—IMPROVING REGULATION AND ACCESS 
Canada has always had diverse family forms, but until relatively recently 
only the traditional, heterosexual marriage was considered worthy of social 
or legal recognition.  Today, there is an increasing diversity of family 
forms as well as greater visibility for those such as same-sex partners who 
may have previously been more secretive about their relationships.  
Canadian law has extended its legal recognition of adult relationships to 
include same-sex marriage and non-marital cohabitation, and has 
recognized psychological parentage.  There is also a growing acceptance of 
the legal significance of same-sex parental partners and the use of ARTs to 
assist in procreation.  However, the law has not kept pace with changes in 
social behavior and the changing nature of ARTs.  Consequently, all 
jurisdictions in Canada should undertake a review of their legislation 
governing parentage and children conceived by ARTs. 
Parents and children should not be put to the expense of having to 
litigate to establish recognition of their relationships.  Rather, there should 
be a legal structure that reflects the psychological realities of children’s 
lives and takes adequate account of the intentions of those individuals who 
                                                          
the gaps” of legislation. 
 205. Id. at para. 35. 
 206. See id. at para. 37 (explaining that because it is not in the best interests of the 
child to have one of the women raising him not recognized as his legal mother, the 
court may fix the discrepancy though parens patrae jurisdiction). 
33
Bala and Ashbourne: The Widening Concept of Parent in Canada: Step-Parents, Same-Sex
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012
  
558 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:3 
are using ARTs to conceive such children.  The availability of appropriate 
legislative guidance is vitally important for those using ARTs, the children 
who are conceived in this manner, and the medical and legal professionals 
who work with these families. 
In response to these concerns, in July 2010 the government of British 
Columbia released its White Paper on Family Relations Act Reform (White 
Paper).207  This document has provided important guidance for reform in 
that province, as well as useful guidance for reform elsewhere in Canada.  
The recommendations set out in the White Paper provide that where 
assisted conception is used—with the exception of surrogacy—the birth 
mother’s opposite-sex or same-sex spouse, whether or not they are married, 
is presumed to be the child’s other parent, a presumption that may be 
rebutted if the partner did not consent to insemination.208  The White Paper 
also provides that third-party donors of eggs, sperm, or an embryo are not 
to be considered parents solely by virtue of their donation.209  However, 
where assisted conception is used, a child may have more than two legal 
parents if the parties involved all agree and set out their intentions in 
writing prior to the assisted conception.210  Further, surrogacy agreements 
are to be given legal recognition, though they are not to be fully 
enforceable.211  For example, while a birth mother who has agreed to act as 
a surrogate is not to be required to relinquish her status as the child’s parent 
to the intended parent(s) based only on an agreement made prior to the 
birth of the child, if after birth she provides the intended parent(s) with her 
written consent, effectively turning over parentage of the child to the 
intended parent(s), and the intended parent(s) take the child into their care, 
then the parentage of the intended parents will be established.  In 
November 2011, the proposals in the White Paper were enacted by the 
legislature in British Columbia,212 though the new law has not been 
proclaimed in force, and at the time of writing, no date had been set for the 
legislation to come into effect. 
While this Article has focused on legal issues related to parentage and 
the regulation of ARTs, often the most significant issues facing individuals 
who wish to conceive children using ARTs concern access to services and 
to the human gametes and embryos needed for ARTs.  Indeed, in Canada, 
                                                          
 207. B.C., MINISTRY OF ATTORNEY GEN., JUSTICE SERV. BRANCH, CIVIL POLICY AND 
LEGISLATION OFFICE, WHITE PAPER ON FAMILY RELATIONS ACT REFORM: PROPOSALS 
FOR A NEW FAMILY LAW ACT (2010) at 10. 
 208. Id. at 36. 
 209. Id. at 86. 
 210. See id. at 55 (explaining that one of the problems with presuming that donors 
are also parents could mean that they would be required to pay child support when it 
was never intended by the terms of the agreement for them to do so). 
 211. Id. at 86. 
 212. British Columbia Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25. §§ 23-33. 
34
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss3/7
  
2012] THE WIDENING CONCEPT OF “PARENT” IN CANADA 559 
the greatest legal impediment to accessing ARTs is the prohibition in the 
Reproduction Act on payments to gamete donors, which has the effect of 
dramatically reducing domestic supply.  As mentioned above, this has 
resulted in the importation of frozen semen (at considerable cost) as well as 
the denial of ready access to fresh semen, which some believe is preferable 
for artificial insemination.213  Wealthy couples and individuals seeking to 
use ARTs or surrogacy can overcome these impediments by engaging in 
‘reproductive tourism’—that is, going to other countries, such as the United 
States, where surrogacy and other practices are legal and available, for a 
price. 
Assisted reproductive technology needs to be regulated to ensure that 
high quality services are being provided, and to prevent exploitation and 
protect the interests of children.  However, Canada’s current ban on 
payments does not meet the needs of either those wishing to use ARTs or 
those who may be willing to act as donors albeit with suitable 
compensation.  Canada should adopt a system that allows for payments to 
gamete and embryo donors, particularly for ova donors who must endure 
considerable inconvenience, as well as some medical risk and discomfort 
upon donation.  The arguments in favor of permitting some form of 
payment are even stronger in the case of surrogate mothers who experience 
more serious risks, discomfort and income loss.  The examples offered by 
other jurisdictions—like some American states—that allow for payments 
clearly indicate that it is possible to balance concerns about preventing 
exploitation while at the same time encouraging donations by providing for 
reasonable compensation.214 
Finally, although all residents of Canada have access to government 
funded “medically necessary” health treatment without charge, until 
recently ARTs have not been regarded as “medically necessary” anywhere 
in Canada, and in most provinces individuals are still required to pay the 
considerable costs associated with ARTs.  However, beginning in August 
2010 in Quebec, the provincial government began to cover the costs to 
enable infertile Quebec couples to have up to three IVF treatment cycles 
including egg harvesting, in-vitro fertilization, pre-implant genetic testing, 
embryo transfer and sperm sample collection.215  Additionally, single 
                                                          
 213. There is some lingering controversy over whether impregnation rates are higher 
and birth defects lower with fresh semen.  See, e.g., H. Yavetz et al., The Efficiency of 
Cryopreserved Semen versus Fresh Semen for In Vitro Fertilization/Embryo Transfer, 
8 J. ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 145 (1990). 
 214. For a review of some experiences involving payments to surrogate mothers and 
a detailed argument in favor of allowing this in Canada, see Busby & Vun, supra note 
122.  
 215. Robin Hilborn, Provincial Help for the Infertile in Canada—Free IVF in 
Québec; Tax Help in Manitoba; Ontario Balks, FERTILITY HELPER (Sept. 16, 2010), 
http://www.familyhelper.net/iy/news/100917quebecivf.html. 
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women and lesbian couples in that province can now get sperm 
insemination fully paid for by the government.216  Most other Canadian 
provinces, by contrast, do not typically cover the costs associated with most 
assisted reproduction treatments.217  For example, in Ontario the 
government will pay for three in-vitro fertilization cycles only if a woman 
has both fallopian tubes blocked.218  Although in 2009 a government-
appointed panel called for increased government support for ARTs, Ontario 
has yet to act on these recommendations.219  While in some places in 
Canada there are charitable organizations that provide some limited 
assistance to infertile couples seeking medical treatment, too often costly 
ART treatments are unaffordable.220  Canada’s publicly-funded health care 
system is under considerable financial stress, and so there should be limits 
on government funding for ART for infertile couples where there is a low 
probability of a successful birth.  However, Canadian provincial 
governments should at least provide some financial support and improve 
accessibility for those seeking medical involvement to conceive a child, 
especially for the relatively inexpensive processes involved in the artificial 
insemination of women without male partners, which involve lower cost 
and risk than other ART processes such as in vitro fertilization and embryo 
transfers. 
                                                          
 216. Id. 
 217. See id. (noting that other provinces do not have the funding to provide serves 
for the infertile). 
 218. Id. 
 219. ONT., MINISTRY OF CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVS., RAISING 
EXPECTATIONS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EXPERT PANEL ON INFERTILITY AND 
ADOPTION (2009). 
 220. A controversial recent Canadian response to the high cost of infertility 
treatment in Canada was a “win-a-baby” contest, sponsored by an Ottawa radio station, 
which offered $35,000 worth of treatment to five couples, who were required to write 
letters explaining why they wanted the treatment.  See, e.g., Paul Townsend, Contest 
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